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Abstract
Disclosure has become the preferred way of addressing the threat to researcher objectivity arising 
from financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs). This article argues that the effectiveness of disclosure 
at protecting science from the corrupting effects of FCOIs—particularly the kind of disclosure 
mandated by US federal granting agencies—is more limited than is generally acknowledged. Current 
NIH and NSF regulations require disclosed FCOIs to be reviewed, evaluated, and managed by 
officials at researchers’ home institutions. However, these reviewers are likely to have institutional 
and personal interests of their own that may undermine the integrity of their evaluations. This 
paper presents experimental findings suggesting that such interests affect third-party assessments 
of FCOIs. Over 200 participants gauged the ethical significance of various hypothetical yet realistic 
FCOIs in academic research settings. Some of them were led to believe they had a small personal 
interest in allowing conflicted research to proceed, whereas others’ personal outcomes were 
unrelated to the conflicted research. The results show that motivated reasoning influences FCOI 
evaluations, such that those with personal interest in conflicted research provided more lenient 
evaluations of researcher FCOIs. These findings imply that the capacity of federally mandated 
FCOI disclosure procedures to enhance bias-free science is quite restricted.
Keywords
conflicts of interest, research ethics, disclosure, self-interest, objectivity
Corresponding author:
Samuel V. Bruton, Department of Philosophy and Religion, The University of Southern 
Mississippi, 118 College Drive #5116, Hattiesburg, MS 39406-0001, USA. 
Email: Samuel.Bruton@usm.edu
739940 REA0010.1177/1747016117739940Research EthicsBruton and Sacco
research-article2017
Original Article: Empirical
2 Research Ethics 14(4)
Introduction
For some time, regulators, policy-makers, and ordinary citizens alike have been 
concerned about real and perceived threats to science posed by researchers’ finan-
cial conflicts of interest (FCOIs). These concerns have been heightened both by 
well-publicized recent scandals and by a growing number of collaborations 
between academic scientists and for-profit entities ranging from small partner-
ships and start-ups to pharmaceutical corporations. As is true in professional 
domains such as financial services, real estate, and medical practice, disclosure 
has become the preferred way of addressing risks to integrity posed by research-
ers’ FCOIs (Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2014; Loewenstein et al., 2011). FCOI 
disclosure is now required by most academic journals, granting agencies, and aca-
demic institutions, and it is advocated by most disciplinary codes of ethics and 
other advisory documents. In 2011, the US Public Health Service (PHS) tightened 
disclosure mandates for funded scientists.
There is much to be said for disclosure as a primary response to the problem of 
FCOIs. For one thing, disclosure is less restrictive than outright bans on conflicted 
relationships, reapportionments of research tasks, or other more intrusive 
approaches. Typically, disclosure allows conflicted projects to proceed as planned. 
This serves the interests of both science and society generally, since less academic 
research would be completed without private sector funding and the conflicted 
relationships it often engenders (Resnik, 2010). Industrial support also benefits 
those who are involved in the work. It helps researchers develop promising ideas, 
provides support for student assistants, and may produce valuable intellectual 
property for researchers’ institutions. Furthermore, disclosure respects individu-
als’ autonomy in that it allows both researchers and other affected parties to “decide 
for themselves.” Such latitude reconciles the importance of clear policies with the 
fact that case-by-case, FCOIs vary considerably relative to the specific relation-
ships involved, the nature of the research, and other details. Disclosure also is 
easily accomplished and cost free.
Whether it adequately addresses risks to integrity induced by researchers’ finan-
cial interests can be questioned, however. While some limitations and drawbacks 
of disclosure, both inside and outside academic science, have been well docu-
mented (Elliott, 2008; Loewenstein et al., 2011; Resnik and Elliott, 2013), the 
purpose of this article is to highlight a neglected facet of disclosure’s effective-
ness: the likelihood that those who review others’ FCOI disclosures will be influ-
enced by their own motivations. We present results of an experimental study 
suggesting that in contexts modeling those found in PHS and National Science 
Foundation (NSF) regulations, reviewers’ assessments tend to be influenced either 
by their own interests or those of their institutions. Assuming these same effects 
occur also in “real world” reviews—as one would expect that they would—they 
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reveal a specific pathway through which conflicts of interest may corrupt assess-
ments of research integrity. In both cases, motivated reasoning undermines, or at 
least threatens, professional integrity, limiting the effectiveness of third-party dis-
closure assessment as a means of ensuring scientists’ objectivity.
We begin by briefly summarizing relevant literature and the procedures man-
dated by current US PHS and NSF disclosure policies. Next, experimental evi-
dence of the potential influence of self-interest on disclosure reviewers is presented, 
evidence based on research participant evaluations of a range of fictional but real-
istic and research-related scenarios. As hypothesized, reviewers’ own perceived 
direct or indirect interests affect their judgments about academics’ disclosed 
FCOIs. In conclusion, the implications of these results for FCOI disclosure policy 
more generally are discussed. Our main point is not that disclosure is ill-advised; 
certainly, it is an aspect of openness and transparency. The point, rather, is that by 
itself, disclosure does less to address the problem of FCOI-related objectivity than 
is often hoped for or presumed.
Background
Though FCOIs in scientific research have existed almost long as science itself, 
concerns about academic researchers’ FCOIs have grown over the past several 
decades. In the US, the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, together with the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and other subsequent legislation and executive 
orders (Eisenberg, 1996), have facilitated funding relationships between academic 
researchers, their institutions, and industry, and these relationships have become 
progressively more numerous and complex over the past three decades (Kleinman, 
2010; Krimsky, 2010). Collaborations also have been spurred by declining gov-
ernment funding for public education and research—which universities have tried 
to address partly with private research contracts (Prasad and Cifu, 2015)—and by 
increased demands that universities become engines for economic development 
(Bok, 2003). Meanwhile, the public has become increasingly aware of misdeeds 
by academic scientists with FCOIs. Prominent recent examples include collusion 
between researchers and the sugar industry in nutrition studies (O’Connor, 2016), 
reports on the uses and safety of blockbuster drugs Vioxx and Paxil (Brophy, 2016; 
Jureidini et al., 2008), and publications downplaying the risks of both global 
warming and fracking written by academics with ties to the oil and gas industry 
(Giles and Scwartz, 2015; Siegel et al., 2015).
Such examples fuel suspicions that when researchers’ personal financial inter-
ests bear significantly and directly on their work, impartial science is likely to 
suffer. Though commonly discussed in terms of a “bias,” the bias metaphor is at 
least potentially misleading in this context (Davis, 2012). “Bias” connotes a sys-
tematic tilt, as is found in an incorrectly calibrated scale. While individuals can 
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suffer from such consistent distortions, the corrupting effects of FCOIs in aca-
demic research more typically arise in situation-specific and less predictable ways. 
In part, this is because academics’ financial relationships with industrial sponsors 
can take many forms: salary, stock, equity or stock options, consulting fees, hono-
raria, cash awards, travel, and intellectual property, including patents and copy-
rights. Also, financial interests can consciously or unconsciously influence 
decision making at any number of points in the scientific process: problem selec-
tion, hypothesis formulation, research design, sample selection, data collection, 
data analysis and interpretation, and dissemination of findings. These complexi-
ties make the problem of FCOIs in academic research resistant to a mechanical, 
“one-size-fits-all” solution.
Of course, the mere fact that a scientist has a financial stake in his or her work 
does not automatically entail lost objectivity. Nevertheless, considerable evidence 
exists that financial interests can and often do influence research in both subtle and 
not-so-subtle ways. Data analyses readily can be misleadingly subverted or dis-
torted (Fava, 2016; Jane-wit et al., 2010; Page et al., 2013; Resnik, 2010). 
“Significance chasing” or “p-hacking”—presenting statistically significant yet un-
hypothesized findings as having been predicted from the start—can lead to the 
proliferation of Type 1 errors. A version of this technique was used by 
GlaxoSmithKline as part of its deceptive marketing of Paxil (Belluz, 2015). 
“Design bias,” resulting from use of inappropriate controls, selective inclusion of 
variables, flawed sampling, or under-powered methodologies, is a notable concern 
(Fugh-Berman, 2013; Irwin, 2009; Sismondo, 2008). It was a factor, for example, 
in the misleading recent hyping of Tamiflu by Roche (Prasad and Cifu, 2015). 
There is widespread evidence of the non-publication of negative results, com-
monly referred to as the “file-drawer” problem (Fanelli, 2012), influencing for 
example the perceived efficacy of antidepressants (Turner et al., 2008). Sometimes, 
fine-grained discrepancies exist between research findings and what is ultimately 
reported (Vera-Badillo et al., 2013). A recent analysis found that compared with 
studies not sponsored by industry, industry-sponsored studies of drugs and medi-
cal devices are more likely to report positive and beneficial findings and less likely 
to show agreement between the article’s conclusion and its reported results (Lundh 
et al., 2017). The fact that so many of these problems have occurred in medical and 
pharmaceutical research simply reflects the fact that, at present, this where the 
financial stakes are highest.
Some recent commentators have argued that concerns about scientists’ FCOIs 
are exaggerated, either on grounds that the recommended cures are worse than the 
disease or because such worries are caused by knee-jerk emotional reactions more 
than hard data (Allison, 2009; Rosenbaum, 2015a, 2015b). Others object that such 
concerns unjustly malign researchers with financial interests, since typical career 
pressures and other personal interests can affect research objectivity too (Resnik, 
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2007), or that the focus on FCOIs sows too much distrust (Johnsson et al., 2014). 
However, these sorts of broad dismissals are increasing rare, particularly given 
accumulating evidence of how unreliable much recent scientific work is proving 
to be (Ioannidis, 2005, 2012). Concerns about FCOIs are also sometimes dis-
missed too quickly as a problem only for a “few bad apples” (Cain and Detsky, 
2008). However, conflicts of interest produce motivated reasoning—reasoning 
geared towards reaching a desired conclusion—for most people and in a great 
variety of circumstances (Mazar and Ariely, 2015). Doctors, for instance, long 
believed themselves immune to influence resulting from trivial gifts from pharma-
ceutical companies. The evidence is abundantly clear, however, that even small 
favors and incentives affect their behavior (Brody, 2007; Dana and Loewenstein, 
2003). Despite this, most researchers continue to believe that they are largely unaf-
fected by conflicts of interest and that mere disclosure of them is ethically suffi-
cient (Mecca et al., 2015).
On the face of it, disclosure might mitigate diminished objectivity in two ways. 
First, by increasing transparency, it could help journal editors, peer reviews, and 
other researchers accurately interpret and evaluate research aims, methods, and 
findings, in part by ratcheting up skepticism about findings and conclusions in 
conflicted reports. Second, it could make researchers less likely to enter into con-
flict-producing relationships in the first place, preferring simply to avoid possible 
doubts about the integrity of their work. A third and distinct possibility is that 
disclosure might help assuage broader social concerns about research integrity by 
signaling that measures are in place to guard against corruption. The difference 
between the first two and the third corresponds to a distinction Ziman draws 
between “cognitive objectivity,” which involves the physical reality science 
endeavors to understand, and its “social objectivity,” which depends on the pub-
lic’s confidence in science’s credibility (Ziman, 2003).
These potential benefits have spurred a strong impetus towards FCOI disclosure, 
beginning in the mid-1980s. Two leading academic medical journals adopted dis-
closure requirements at that time (Krimsky, 2010), and in 1995 both the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the NSF began requiring universities 
to document and manage FCOIs. The expressed purpose of these virtually identical 
regulations was to “establish standards and procedures to be followed by institu-
tions” to promote “objectivity” by ensuring that funded research “will not be biased 
by any conflicting financial interest of those investigators responsible for the 
research” (DHHS, 1995; NSF, 1995). During the early 2000s, surveys of science 
and medical journals showed a rapid growth in disclosure requirements (Krimsky, 
2010), and scientists overwhelmingly prefer or strongly prefer disclosure to more 
intrusive approaches (Lockhart et al., 2013; Weinfurt et al., 2006). In 2011, revised 
DHHS regulations covering all PHS funding, including National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) research grants, were put in place (DHHS, 2011).
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The key features of the current PHS regulations are worth summarizing, given 
their pertinence to the findings provided below. Funded investigators must regu-
larly disclose several kinds of “significant financial interests” (SFIs) related to 
their “institutional obligations” to officials at their academic institutions. The 2011 
revisions lowered SFI thresholds: researchers now must reveal any equity interests 
in non-publically traded entities, any intellectual property rights, corporately 
funded travel, and equity stakes worth $5000 or more in publically traded entities. 
However, primary onus for collecting, reviewing, and “managing” researchers’ 
disclosed conflicts lies with the institutions. Crucially, institutions must determine 
which if any researcher SFIs constitute bona fide “financial conflicts of interest,” 
that is, financial interests “that could directly and significantly affect the design, 
conduct, or reporting of the NIH-funded research” (DHHS 2011). If so, the institu-
tion must develop and put in place adequate safeguards and complete retrospective 
reviews and mitigation reports in the case of researcher non-compliance. Overall, 
the regulations largely defer to institutions to judge the seriousness of the threat 
posed by disclosed conflicts, and institutions also are responsible for making 
researchers’ disclosures publicly accessible, such as through a university-main-
tained website. NSF policy on FCOI disclosure varies in some details, but the 
underlying mechanisms for enhancing research objectivity are largely the same. In 
both cases, institutions are obligated to police themselves.
How much these regulations do to promote objectivity, their declared purpose, 
is not clear. Consider first the goal of encouraging better researcher behavior. 
While mandatory disclosure sometimes leads people to avoid conflicts, conflict 
avoidance is a function of how avoidable the conflicts are (Sah and Loewenstein, 
2014). In many academic research contexts, projects simply would be impossible 
without industrial involvement. Also, mandatory disclosure has been shown to 
encourage worse behavior. So-called “moral licensing” occurs because having ful-
filled their disclosure obligations, individuals sometimes take ethical liberties 
elsewhere (Cain et al., 2011; Effron and Conway, 2015). In effect, disclosure ena-
bles conflicted individuals to displace their ethical responsibilities onto others’ 
shoulders, having already supplied evidence of their own moral credentials (Brown 
et al., 2011). In addition, compared with physicians or financial advisors, research-
ers are especially susceptible to the “identifiability effect” (Sah, 2012). People are 
less conscientious regarding their conflicts of interest when they perceive greater 
psychological distance from those who might be adversely affected by their 
actions. Obviously, researchers are often far removed from those most likely to 
suffer from their flawed work.
Neither is disclosure likely to be as useful to reviewers as one might suppose. 
Findings from other professional domains are instructive. Research regarding 
FCOI disclosures by physicians finds that while transparency makes some patients 
trust them less, it makes others trust physicians more (Weinfurt et al., 2008), 
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presumably because it is taken as a sign of their trustworthiness. Another study 
showed that while medical journal peer reviewers reported increased general skep-
ticism about conflicted research, ultimately their assessments of individual manu-
scripts were usually unchanged by disclosure (Lippert et al., 2011). Similarly, a 
study of the likelihood of prescribing a drug based on the results of a hypothetical 
trial concluded that FCOI disclosures had little impact on physician’s self-reported 
behavior. While disclosures induced skepticism towards conflicted research when 
directly compared with non-conflicted work, this skepticism was not produced by 
conflicted research evaluated in isolation (Silverman et al., 2010). Consider also 
substantial evidence documenting the poor reliability of peer review in general. 
Studies have shown low inter-rater reliability, whether reviewers are evaluating 
journal manuscripts (Bornmann et al., 2010) or grant applications (Marsh et al., 
2008; Mutz et al., 2012), particularly when reported findings are contrary to the 
reviewer’s theoretical perspective (Mahoney, 1977).
In fact, two factors make discerning, objective review of researchers’ FCOI 
disclosures difficult. The first, alluded to above, is the awkwardness of outsider 
review of research (Sax and Doran, 2011). Administrative officials, even those 
with a background in science, may lack the specific disciplinary expertise needed 
to question a specialists’ judgment. Researchers from nearby areas of inquiry at 
the same institution likewise may feel uncomfortable appearing to doubt a peer’s 
approach. Not wanting to appear distrustful, it is easier simply to defer. In other 
contexts, disclosure has been demonstrated to produce compliance with conflicted 
advice (Sah et al., 2013).
The second problem, arguably more insidious and pervasive than the first, is 
motivated reasoning. Much as a scientist with a financial conflict of interest in the 
work has two competing motivations, a similar dynamic faces those who must 
review disclosures from researchers at their institutions. Allowing the work to 
proceed with minimal interference will in many cases best serve the interests of 
the institution and will please those who want the work to proceed. Reasons for 
caution, on the other hand, often will be cognitively indeterminate and ethically 
malleable. Situations such as this enable people to act as “motivated Bayesians,” 
doing what serves their interests while acting conscientiously enough to feel good 
about their own ethicality (Gino et al., 2016). After all, switching back-and-forth 
between dual roles is cognitively difficult (Moore et al., 2010); it is hard to be an 
impartial and neutral practitioner in one respect while being partisan advocate in 
another. People typically believe they are being objective, but what they desire to 
be true shapes their interpretation of scientific evidence even more than their ini-
tial beliefs (Bastardi et al., 2011).
Once again, analogous circumstances to FCOI disclosure evaluation provide 
plentiful supporting evidence. As Saver has argued persuasively regarding 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), the pressure to conform ethical evaluations to 
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social and institutional pressures can be difficult to resist, particularly when few 
incentives favor skepticism (Saver, 2004). Also, in evaluating conflict of interest 
policies, physicians viewed proposed conflict of interest policies in medical set-
tings more critically and less favorably than nearly identical policies applied to 
financial investments; the attitudes of financial planners were the reverse. 
Professionals’ biases tend to mirror those of the institutions they serve (Sharek 
et al., 2008: 377). So too for lawyers, who are swayed by their own financial inter-
ests when advising clients (Moore et al., 2005). External auditors hired to evaluate 
the integrity of corporations’ book-keeping tend to shade to their audits; those they 
audit pay for their work (Moore et al., 2006). Likewise, corporate boards often are 
reluctant to check CEOs’ FCOIs aggressively (Lin, 1996). As noted above, such 
influences often operate without conscious awareness of those affected by them 
and without intentional compromise of their judgment (Chugh, 2005). Those ben-
efited by their skewed judgment tend to be close-by and familiar, while those 
potentially hurt by it are unknown and remote.
All of these strands of evidence suggest that that neutral evaluation of others’ 
disclosed FCOIs is not easy, and that the sort of institutionally based third-party 
review mandated by federal granting agencies is likely to be affected by motivated 




After first securing IRB approval, study participation was solicited though the 
university’s online experiment portal (SONA Research Systems). In total, 229 
undergraduate students volunteered in exchange for partial course credit (189 
women, 37 men, three undisclosed gender; Mean age: 21.41 years, SD = 5.50 
years). After giving informed consent, participants read a standard definition of 
financial conflict of interest:
A financial conflict of interest is a situation in which someone’s work-related obligations or 
professional responsibilities potentially conflict with his or her personal financial interests. 
Financial conflicts of interest raise questions about possible bias, and they can exist even when 
no one has done anything wrong.
To simulate the self-interest of institutional FCOI reviewers, study participants 
then were given a fictional statement about a new federal initiative. The statement 
claimed that states were to begin receiving fixed-sum supplements to academic 
research funding already received at their institutions from federal grants or pri-
vate industry sponsors (see Appendix). Ultimately, supplemental funds were to be 
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distributed to funded scientists and to students in the form of tuition rebates, but 
the total disbursable share available at each institution depended on the portion of 
the state’s research dollars garnered by members of that institution’s faculty. 
Research funds received by researchers at one institution increased the supple-
mental share available to that institution’s researchers and students and reduced 
the amount available to the rest of the state. The ruse was designed to encourage 
participants to think they could benefit in a small yet direct way by allowing con-
flicted research at their institution to proceed.
Participants then assessed 10 scenarios presented in randomized order in which 
academic researchers from various disciplines had FCOIs (see Appendix). They 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions on a between-participants basis: 
2 (disclosure, non-disclosure) × 2 (own university, competitor university). Each 
scenario involved a researcher who either did or did not appropriately disclose an 
FCOI and was from either the participants’ home university or an in-state competi-
tor. Participants then were asked to answer four questions about each vignette, the 
first three, presented in randomized order, using Likert scales: “To what extent is 
this situation a financial conflict of interest (1 = not at all a financial conflict of 
interest; 7 = very much a financial conflict of interest)?” “To what extent is this 
situation unethical (1 = not at all unethical; 7 = very much unethical)?” “To what 
extent is this situation likely to affect the researcher’s objectivity (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = very likely)?” In the fourth question, participants were asked what the 
researcher in each situation should do: Continue the research activity AND con-
tinue the financial relationship with the external entity; End the relationship with 
the external entity BUT continue the research activity; or Discontinue the research 
activity BUT continue financial relationship with external entity. Importantly, the 
first option would provide the most favorable outcome not only for the researcher, 
but also for the third party (i.e., participants) should they provide a favorable eval-
uation of the potential researcher FCOI, specifically when that research was to be 
conducted at the participants’ own institution.
After assessing the scenarios, participants provided brief demographic informa-
tion (e.g., age, gender) and were redirected to an online debriefing form.
Results
Perceptions of FCOI, ethicality, and objectivity based on affiliation 
and disclosure
Because FCOI (α = .83), ethicality (α = .81), and objectivity (α = .82) perceptions 
were reliable across scenarios, we averaged participants’ responses to create a com-
posite of perceptions of FCOIs, ethicality, and objectivity, where higher scores 
reflect greater perceptions that the situations represented a significant FCOI, would 
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be of greater ethical concern, and would be a greater threat to researcher objectivity, 
respectively. We then conducted three separate 2 disclosure (disclosure, non-disclo-
sure) × 2 affiliation (own university, competitor universities) between-subjects 
ANOVAs for perceptions of FCOI, ethicality, and objectivity, respectively.
For FCOI perceptions, the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of 
disclosure, F(1,225) = 10.51, p = .001, ηp2 = .045, such that participants in the non-
disclosure condition indicated that the situations were more of an FCOI (M = 4.54, 
SD = 1.21) than participants in the disclosure condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.10). 
There was no main effect of researchers’ institutional affiliations, nor an interac-
tion between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .68).
Regarding ethicality of the situations themselves, again the only significant effect 
to emerge was a main effect of disclosure, F(1,225) = 19.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .081, 
such that participants in the non-disclosure condition indicated that the situations 
were more unethical (M = 4.45, SD = 1.14) than participants in the disclosure con-
dition (M = 3.83, SD = .95). There was no main effect of researchers’ institutional 
affiliations, nor an interaction between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .36).
For assessments of whether the researchers’ objectivity was likely to be affected, 
the only significant effect to emerge was a main effect of disclosure, F(1,225) = 
10.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .046, such that participants in the non-disclosure condition 
indicated that the situation was more likely to affect ethicality (M = 4.66, SD = 
1.09) than participants in the disclosure condition (M = 4.20, SD = 1.01). There 
was no main effect of researchers’ institutional affiliations, nor an interaction 
between affiliation and disclosure (ps > .22).
Thus, regardless of whether the researcher was affiliated with one’s own institu-
tion or not, participants reported that researchers with undisclosed rather than dis-
closed financial relationships had more of an FCOI, were in less ethical situations, 
and a situation more likely to affect the researchers’ objectivity.
Decisions regarding researcher conduct
In order to determine if there were differences in participants’ recommendations as 
to what the researchers should do, we divided the frequency with which partici-
pants made each type of decision and divided that by the total number of scenarios. 
This yielded a percentage for each decision type, ranging from 0% to 100%. We 
then conducted a 2 affiliation (participants’ university, competitor university) × 2 
disclosure (FCOI disclosed, FCOI undisclosed) × 3 decision (continue both, con-
tinue research only, continue financial relationship only) mixed-model ANOVA, 
with repeated measures over the last factor. This analysis yielded a main effect of 
decision, F(2,450) = 45.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .170; post hoc tests revealed that to an 
equal degree, participants thought that the researcher should continue both the 
research and the financial relationship (M = .40, SD = .22) or continue the research 
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only (M = .39, SD = .22) as compared with the option of continuing only the finan-
cial relationship (M = .21, SD = .16; ps < .001, ds > .93). There was no significant 
difference in participants’ preference for the researcher to continue both the 
research and financial relationship or to continue only the research (p = .584, d = 
.05). These findings are sensible. Whereas the first and second options have a col-
lective benefit, either to the researcher and participant or the researcher and soci-
ety, the third option really only benefits the researcher. Thus, participants were 
sensitive to these different benefits, selecting options one and two equivalently 
and more frequently than option three.
Importantly, this analysis also yielded an interaction between affiliation and 
decision, F(2,450) = 4.01, p = .019, ηp2 = .018. To better interpret this interaction, 
we conducted independent samples t-tests to compare decisions across the univer-
sity affiliations. Participants were more likely to recommend that a researcher 
described as from their own institution should continue both the research and the 
financial relationship (M = .44, SD = .22) than if the researcher was from a com-
petitor institution (M = .36, SD = .21), t(227) = 2.52, p = .012, d = .33. Participants 
were equally likely to report that a researcher should continue the research while 
severing the financial relationship, regardless of whether the researcher was 
described as from their own institution (M = .38, SD = .21) or a competitor institu-
tion (M = .39, SD = .22), t(227) = –.48, p = .634, d = .06. Participants were more 
likely to recommend that a researcher at a competitor institution should continue 
only the financial relationship (M = .23, SD = .17) than if the researcher was at 
their own institution (M = .18, SD = .14), t(227) = –2.49, p = .013, d = .33. These 
findings are consistent with motivated reasoning, such that evaluations of FCOIs 
are more favorable when participants have something to gain personally from the 
relationship.
There was also an interaction between disclosure and decision, F(2,450) = 5.44, 
p = .005, ηp2 = .024. To better interpret this interaction, we conducted independent 
samples t-tests to compare type of decision across disclosure condition. Participants 
were more likely to indicate that the researcher should continue both the research 
and the financial relationship in the disclosure condition (M = .44, SD = .21) com-
pared with the non-disclosure condition (M = .36, SD = .22), t(227) = 3.02, p = 
.003, d = .40. Participants were marginally more likely to report that the researcher 
should continue the research while severing ties with external supporters in the 
non-disclosure condition (M = .41, SD = .23) compared with the disclosure condi-
tion (M = .36, SD = .20), t(227) = -1.84, p = .067, d = .24. Participants were equally 
likely to indicate that researchers should continue the financial relationship while 
terminating the research in the disclosure (M = .19, SD = .16) and non-disclosure 
conditions (M = .22, SD = .16), t(227) = 1.38, p = .169, d = .18.
There was not a significant three-way interaction between affiliation, dis-
closure, and decision (p = .462), and no other significant effects emerged from 
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this analysis (all ps > .100). The lack of a three-way interaction indicates that 
the impact of disclosure and university affiliation may be independent of one 
another. Thus, participants reported that researchers should continue both the 
research and the financial relationship only if they have disclosed their FCOIs 
and continue the research while severing the external financial tie if their 
FCOIs had not been disclosed. However, participants believed it was more 
appropriate for researchers with FCOIs to maintain the financial ties while 
continuing the research activity if researchers were at their own institution 
compared with competitor institutions; however, they were more likely to indi-
cate that researchers at competitor institutions should continue only the finan-
cial relationship while discontinuing the research compared with researchers 
at their own institution.
Thus, it appears that individuals are sensitive to the potential problems of 
FCOIs, regardless of whether it is a researcher at their own institution or a com-
petitor institution. However, they are more willing to give a researcher the benefit 
of the doubt, so to speak, when researchers are from their own institution, as was 
reflected in greater support for researchers continuing both the research and the 
financial relationship. This latter situation is the most beneficial to participants 
themselves based on the cover story they received, because according to the ruse 
they had been told, the more money researchers obtained at their own institution, 
the greater the tuition rebate they could receive. Conversely, the more money 
researchers obtained at competitor institutions, the less available for them. The 
dynamic was zero sum. The upshot is that while participants are very sensitive to 
the problems associated with FCOIs, they are more inclined to overlook the 
impact of those problems if doing so benefits themselves.
Discussion and conclusion
In light of evidence presented above about motivated reasoning and difficulties 
associated with FCOI evaluation, these findings are perhaps not surprising. 
However, they support a point not previously studied experimentally: the impact 
of self-interest on FCOI disclosure assessment. Given the responsibility federal 
regulations place on institutions to review FCOI disclosures from their own 
researchers, and the institutional interests typically at stake in disclosure review 
contexts, these findings are thus significant.
Finding meaningful and realistic ways of improving the effectiveness of man-
dated disclosure is not easy, however. Of course, problems resulting from FCOI-
induced incentives in research are remedied most thoroughly by removing the 
conflicts that give rise to them. However, this is not likely to occur, and neither is 
it clearly desirable. In an era in which public budgets are increasingly under pres-
sure, it is unlikely that public support is forthcoming to allow significant limits to 
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industrial involvement in academic research. For example, resources available for 
NIH funding have declined 25% since 2003, adjusting for inflation (Alberts et al., 
2014). Another unlikely change is a significant alteration in the way institutions 
and science itself encourages and even valorizes different kinds of behavior. As is 
true in other professional domains, the rewards for sticking up for what is ethical 
and honest in the face of temptations and pressures to do otherwise are not what 
they should be. Institutional climate, including the way those in positions of power 
are expected to react, has an disproportionate impact on individual decision mak-
ing (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; van Gils et al., 2017).
Two more practicable reforms are worth mentioning. One idea, which has 
advocates in some medical research contexts, is a kind of centralized repository 
of FCOI disclosures (Dunn et al., 2016). Concurrent with grant applications, for 
example, or journal article submissions, researchers could be expected to regis-
ter their conflicts of interest in a sort of global database. Though many details 
in such a system would remain to be worked out, it would have two notable 
advantages lacking in the current, highly fragmented, approach. First, it offers 
the possibility of a standardized approach to what counts as an FCOI. Little 
uniformity presently exists, for example, in the way journals define or report 
FCOIs. Second, global availability of FCOI disclosures would at least partially 
diffuse the current emphasis on local, institutional review. A second reform is a 
more whole-hearted embrace of the kinds of reforms currently advocated by the 
Open Science Network (Miguel et al., 2014). Pre-registering research studies of 
all kinds, not just large-scale clinical trials, as is now the case, could go a long 
way towards reducing some of the more flagrant research abuses.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that tensions between financial 
interests and the norms of good science can perhaps never be smoothed over 
entirely. However, it is important to understand that while far from pointless, the 
effectiveness of disclosure at enhancing research objectivity is more limited than 
is often recognized.
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